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"STATE ACTION" AND THE GIRARD
ESTATE CASE
Hershel Shanks i
Stephen Girard ' was a man of grand conception. But even his
spacious imagination could not have envisaged the impact his carefully-
drawn 2 will was to have on the legal world. Dead these 125 years,
Girard has attained immortality in the law for the legal controversies
engendered by the famous will. Without challenge, the thirty-two page
document lays claim to the title of the most litigated will in history.
Twice has its validity been debated in the highest court of the land; '
hydraheaded, it has been to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at
least ten times; ' its appearances before inferior courts are without
number.
Its finest performance to date was in the landmark case of Vidal v.
Mayor,' which brought into the fray on opposing sides the two gar-
gantuan advocates of their day, Horace Binney and Daniel Webster.
The result was an opinion which established the validity of the charit-
able trust in the United States and has become the bedrock of American
charitable trust law.' Having put the law of charitable trusts on a
firm basis, Stephen Girard's will now turns to more fashionable matter,
t Member, District of Columbia Bar. A.B., 1952, Haverford College; A.M., 1953,
Columbia University; LL.B., 1956, Harvard University.
1. 1750-1831. Biographies of this fascinating early American figure include
WILDgs, LONxLY MIAS (1943) and HRRIcK, SmHazN Gma.R, FoU Dgm (1923).
2. William J. Duane, the scrivener of the final Girard will, testified before a Select
Committee of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on the Estate of Stephen
Girard in 1842 as to the method of drawing the will. Duane's testimony is summarized
in id. at 143: ".... Duane stated that he remained with Girard five or six weeks with
the doors locked, and that in connection with this service all sorts of topics were dis-
cussed by Girard and Duane, including law, politics, religion, and architecture. The
writing was gone over two or three times and drafts of the several sections were
made. Duane further describes the procedure in a statement that a draft, when sub-
mitted to Girard, would be altered and remodeled in accordance with his own ideas,
and that, after such revision, the section would be written over in its final form. Duane
paid Girard a great compliment by declaring that he was 'a good judge of language-
none better.' Of his part in writing the Will, Duane added that he 'took the most
anxious pains to do in writing, what Mr. Girard would, if he had been a painter, have
exhibited on the canvas.'
3. Vidal v. Mayor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844) ; Girard v. Philadelphia, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 1 (1868).
4. In addition to the two cases cited in note 3 supra: Girard v. Mayor, 4 Rawle
323 (Pa. 1833); Beck v. Philadelphia, 17 Pa. 104 (1851) ; Soohan v. Philadelphia, 33
Pa. 9 (1859) ; Philadelphia v. Heirs of Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (1863); Field v. Directors
of Girard College, 54 Pa. 233 (1867); Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870);
Girard's Appeal, 4 Penny. 347 (Pa. 1880) ; In Re Estate of Stephen Girard, 127 A.2d
287 (Pa. 1956).
5. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
6. See 4 ScoTr, TausTs §§ 348, 348.3 (2d ed. 1956).
(213)
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constitutional law. In the tumultuous world of constitutional law, it
has already created its own furor. The result may be as far-reaching
as the Vidal case, for the present Girard Estate case ' offers an oppor-
tunity to consolidate a decade of decisions and thinking on "state
action." This, then, is the raison d'etre of the present discussion.
The heart of Girard's testamentary plan of disposition-as today's
estate planners would call it-was the establishment of a "College"
into which were to be admitted "as many poor white male orphans
between the ages of six and ten years, as the said income shall be
adequate to maintain.. ,, 8 The college was to be established and
maintained by the "'Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens of Philadelphia' "
their successors and assigns" "o as trustee.
Girard College-the name was neither Girard's suggestion nor
command-has since its founder's death become the world's largest
boarding school, housing, educating and caring for over 1,100 father-
less boys. The original endowment of $2,000,000 has grown to
$97,000,000. The envy of many private as well as public schools,
Girard College spends between $15,000 and $20,000 on each student
during his stay. In accordance with the will's instructions the boys
enter between the ages of six and ten, and leave between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen, usually the latter. In addition to the usual edu-
cational curriculum, students are taught ten trades from auto mechanic
to draftsman, one of which is learned more thoroughly. Thus is
fulfilled Girard's request that, they be "taught facts and things, rather
than words and signs. . . ." " Many of the boys go on to college,
and of these a large portion become honor students.
7. It re Estate of Stephen Girard, 127 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1956), affirming 4 D. & C.2d
671 (Philadelphia County Orphans Ct. 1956).
8. Girard Will cl. XXI.
9. This designation of the municipal corporation was changed by the Act of Feb.
2, 1854, PA. STrA. ANN. tit. 53, § 6361 (Purdon 1931), to "The City of Philadelphia."
10. Girard Will cl. XX.
11. Id. cl. XXI. One of the most widespread misconceptions about the school stems
largely from Daniel Webster's accusation in the Vidal case that the school was founded
for propogating atheism. 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 173. This accusation was based on the
will's command that no minister nor ecclesiastic shall enter the College, even as a
visitor. Girard's will explained the proscription: ". . . I do not mean to cast any re-
flection upon any sect or person whatsoever; but, as there is such a multitude of sects,
and such a diversity of opinion amongst them, I desire to keep the tender minds of
the orphans, who are free to derive advantage from this bequest, free from the excite-
ment which clashing doctrines and sectarian controversy are so apt to produce; my
desire is, that all the instructors and the teachers in the college shall take pains to
instil into the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality, so that, on their
entrance into active life, they may, from inclination and habit, evince benevolence to-
wards their fellow-creatures, and a love of truth, sobriety, and industry, adopting at
the same time such religious tenets as their matured reason may enable them to pre-
fer." Girard Will cl. XXI. The boys receive a thorough religious education based on
the Scriptures. In the beautiful college chapel where attendance is compulsory, a
nonsectarian book of worship is used. While there is thus a total absence of denomin-
ationalism in religious teaching within the wall, the boys are encouraged to follow the
religion of their parents and to attend denominational worship outside the school.
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On February 1, 1954 two poor Negro male orphans between the
ages of six and ten years applied for admission to Girard College.
These applications were rejected solely on the ground that the appli-
cants were not "white" as required by the Girard will.
The rejected Negro applicants sought the aid of the courts in their
attempt to be admitted. They claimed that the refusal to admit them
solely on the basis of their color was a violation of their constitutional
rights in that this discriminatory action was, within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, 2 taken by the state and that they were thus
deprived of equal protection of the laws.'" The Board of Directors of
City Trusts, which now serves as agent of the city to administer its
fiduciary duties and powers with respect to charitable trusts,'4 denied
a constitutional violation.
The three Pennsylvania courts which have heard the case ' have
all found in favor of the Board of City Trusts, that Negroes need not be
admitted. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its
decision on November 12, 1956 and produced a lone dissent.' 6 It
appears likely that review 17 will now be sought in the Supreme Court
of the United States.
To determine whether municipal management of a charitable trust
results in state action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment,
12. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. The petitioners' briefs argued several non-constitutional grounds for a decision
in their favor: (1) Violation of the public policy of the city and state governments.
(2) The purpose of the trust has already failed in that a proper education in the terms
in which Girard defined it cannot be received in a segregated atmosphere. Therefore
cy pres should be applied and Negroes admitted in order to accomplish the purpose of
the testator. (3) The trust violates this country's obligations under the United Nations
Charter. Cf. Sayre, Slelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA L. RIv. 1
(1948).
14. The Board is composed of the Mayor, the President of the Councilmanic
Chamber and twelve citizens appointed by- the judges of the Courts of Common Pleas
of Philadelphia. An unsuccessful attack on the Girard Trust on the basis of the Board's
serving as trustee was made in Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169 (1870).
15. The opinions of both the hearing judge and the Orphans' Court en banc may
be found in Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671 (Philadelphia County Orphans Ct.
1956). The Supreme Court opinion has been reported officially as In re Estate of
Stephen Girard, 127 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1956).
16. Justice Musmanno dissented. Chief Justice Stern wrote for the majority and
Justice Bell wrote a concurring opinion. The distributed slip opinions consumed eighty-
two pages.
17. There may be an attempt to seek review by appeal rather than certiorari under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1952) based on the fact that several statutes were passed by the
Pennsylvania legislature to implement the trust. Section 1257 provides: "Final judg-
ments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could
be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: .... (2) By appeal,
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its
being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the
decision is in favor of its validity."
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we shall first examine .the indistinct guideposts afforded by present
Supreme Court literature. Next we shall follow the paths which other
state and lower federal courts have cut into the "state action" wilderness.
Finally, we shall attempt to extricate from all these cases two relatively
general propositions which may provide a satisfactory approach to the
Girard Estate case as well as to other "state action" cases which the
future promises to provide.
THE SUPREME COURT CASES
Exclusive State Functions
Our consideration of Supreme Court cases dealing with "state
action" begins midway in the dramatic series of white primary cases in
which the Negro legally fought for his right to cast an effective ballot."8
In Smith v. Allwright "9 the Supreme Court for the first time applied
constitutional restrictions to a private organization. The Court held
that the action of the Democratic Party of Texas, in passing a resolution
excluding Negroes from membership, was "state action" and violative
of the Constitution.
Until this time the only individual action that had been held
subject to constitutional limitations was that encompassed by the
phrase "acting under color of law," whereby governmental officers were
held to be acting for the state even though they acted outside their
authority." Smith v. Allwright went one step further by applying the
fourteenth amendment to a group which technically had no legal
connection with the state. When the party acted, the state acted. The
party was the agent of the state in spite of the fact that the state only
permitted the resolution rather than commanded it. "[T]he recognition
of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that
state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of
primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the
party's action the action of the State." 21
18. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding unconstitutional a state law
excluding Negroes from voting in primaries); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(holding unconstitutional a state statute giving the Democratic party's executive com-
mittee the power to lay down qualifications for membership); Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935) (holding valid a resolution excluding Negroes adopted by the
Texas Democratic Party membership as a whole) ; Smith v. Alhvright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, supra); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) (holding primary still subject to consti-
tutional limitations even though it was in no way controlled by state regulation);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding a private organization which held
a straw primary prior to the Democratic primary and functioned as part of the elec-
toral process must not discriminate against Negroes).
19. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
20. E.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1870).
21. 321 U.S. at 660.
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The inevitable conclusion followed: "When primaries become-a
part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national, as they
have here, the same tests to determine the character of discrimination
or abridgement should be applied to the primary as are applied to the
general election." 22 This principle was applied to a slightly varying
fact situation by a lower federal court,2 and was fortified by a final
Supreme Court decision, Terry v. Adams.2 4 The "Jaybird Primary"
case, as Terry v. Adams is called, held that a half-century old political
organization that conducted its own straw primary prior to the statutory
primary was nevertheless subject to constitutional limitations in choos-
ing its membership, since it functioned as part of the electoral machin-
ery. A victory in the straw primary was tantamount to a victory in
the election. This was enough for the Supreme Court, despite the fact
that, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "formal state action, either by
way of legislative recognition or official authorization, is wholly want-
ing." 25
These white primary cases arose under the fifteenth amendment
28
rather than the fourteenth amendment. On this ground the cases might
have been restricted, had the Supreme Court chosen to do so, to the
right to vote. That the Court did not so choose is clear from its
decision in Marsh v. Alabama.7
The facts of the Marsh case are simply stated: Chickasaw, Ala-
bama, is a company-owned town. Title to the property is in the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation. "Except for that it has all the characteristics
of any other American town." 2 A Jehovah's Witness undertook to
pass out religious literature while standing on the company-owned
sidewalk. Upon her refusal to leave, she was arrested pursuant to an
Alabama statute which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the
premises of another after having been warned not to do so. Her
conviction under this statute was reversed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The statute as applied to her was unconstitutional,
since it violated her freedom of speech and religion as guaranteed against
state abridgement by the fourteenth amendment. By operating a
municipality, a private party was held to act for the state.
With prophetic words, Justice Black wrote for the majority:
"When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property
22. Id. at 664.
23. Rice v. Elmore 165 F2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875(1948).
24. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
25. Id. at 471.
26. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
27. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
28. Id. at 502.
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against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as
we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a
preferred position." 2
Both the white primary cases and Marsh v. Alabama may easily
be circumscribed by explaining them in terms of what may be called
the state function theory. According to this theory a private individual
or group is subject to constitutional limitations when it undertakes to
perform a function regarded as the exclusive function of the state.
The emphasis is on the word "exclusive." Thus it could be argued that
these cases are inapplicable to Girard Estate because, though education
is a function of the state, it is not exclusively so.
While it is true that in any case in which the application of the
"state function" theory is considered there must of necessity be a
proper dual function exercised, the white primary cases and Marsh
can still be distinguished from the Girard Estate case by the fact that
in the educational sphere there is a legitimate area in which the educa-
tional function may be exercised free of constitutional restraints. Every
election or operation of a community is subject to constitutional limita-
tions no matter who undertakes to perform the function, but this is not
true of every school. Indeed, the Constitution protects the right of a
teacher to teach outside the state system of education and the right of
a student to attend a school outside the state system, provided the
state's minimum educational requirements are met.30
On the other hand, these cases may be given a broader reading,
treating them as suggestive rather than precedential. They are ex-
amples of situations where acts of private individuals and groups are
subject to constitutional restraints in spite of the fact that the state
simply permitted the act. In Marsh, it should be noted, the state did
not even condone the constitutional violation. No state policy to
suppress freedom of religion or speech can be implied from the applica-
tion of the statute to Marsh. Alabama was concerned only with the
protection of property rights. Nevertheless state action was present.
The lesson is that under some circumstances when the state permits
private individuals or groups to violate rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution against state infringement, the state is held to approve the
action and state action results. The state commands, forbids or permits
all action. When it permits action, it has the power-subject always to
29. Id. at 509.
30. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v. State, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Commonwealth v. Beiler, 168
Pa. Super. 462, 464, 79 A.2d 134, 135 (1951) (dictum) ; Commonwealth ex rel. School
District v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 138, 70 A.2d 693, 694 (1950) (dictum).
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constitutional limitations-to forbid this action. In some instances, it
is unconstitutional for the state to abdicate this power. Justice Frank-
furter's words in Terry v. Adams are pertinent: "The evil here is that
the State, through the actions and the abdication of those whom it has
clothed with authority, has permitted white voters to go through a
procedure which predetermines the legally devised primary." 31
Judicial Frontiers: Exasperation and Trepidation
Clearly all behavior which the state permits is not imputable to the
state. Otherwise the fourteenth amendment would apply equally to
private citizens; that the fourteenth amendment is a restriction only on
the states has not been seriously questioned since the Civil Rights
Cases.32
The question then becomes, are there other areas of. permissive
private behavior which may be imputed to the state? More specifically,
must a group or individual exercise an exclusively governmental func-
tion before constitutional restrictions will be applied or are there other
relations between private behavior and the state which will result in
permissive behavior being labelled "state action"? Will the white
primary cases and Marsh v. Alabama be further extended?
A handful of other Supreme Court cases suggest that they will.
To the more theoretical minded these other cases will be exasperating.
It is difficult to find in them any underlying principle which has appli-
cation to fact situations other than their own. Some-Shelly v.
Kraemer 3 and other restrictive covenant cases 84 -are difficult to
understand even in their own terms. They are too few to form a related
pattern. Together they might be characterized as unpatterned jabs
into the future. They clearly go beyond the cases thus far discussed,
yet it is difficult to ascertain the dimension in which they do so. All
that we can safely say is that they prophesy that the final chapter in
the saga of "state action" has not yet been written.
The trepidation with which even the United States Supreme Court
has undertaken to develop the concept of "state action" is illustrated in
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R 5  The Railway Labor Act requires an
employer to recognize a union chosen by a majority of a craft as the
31. 345 U.S. at 477 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added); cf. Truax v. Cor-
rigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
32. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
34. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) ; Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park,
Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S.
880 (1954), order vacated and cert. disinissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
35. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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exclusive bargaining agent.8 6 A local Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen entered into an agreement with the railroad
which effectively limited the employment of Negroes as firemen and
looked to their eventual complete exclusion. The Court held:
"[T]he Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory repre-
sentative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the
interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those
for whom it legislates. . . . Here the discriminations based on
race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious. Congress plainly
did not intend to authorize the bargaining representative to make
such discriminations." 7
Had Congress so intended, "constitutional questions arise," '8
but the opinion appears to go off on the statutory ground. 9 However,
the implication seems to be that the Constitution as well as Congress
requires the union to protect the rights of its Negro and white members
indiscriminately, since the union is acting for the Government.4"
If this is true, here again is permissive action of a private group
circumscribed by constitutional restraints. It is difficult to conceptu-
alize the nexus with the state that requires this result. Why is a busi-
ness corporation, authorized to do business by the state, not subject
to constitutional limitations, while a union, authorized as an exclusive
bargaining representative, is so limited? The answer seems to lie
somewhere in the word "exclusive." An exclusive bargaining power is
a special authorization which impinges on the freedom of others to
represent themselves. Employees and employers have a right to bar-
gain with each other which even Congress could not totally abrogate;
when it undertakes to regulate this right by authorizing an exclusive
bargaining agent, Congress must do so without unreasonably emascu-
lating the right. The vehicle through which this is assured is to im-
pose constitutional restrictions on the bargaining agent by treating it
as an agent of the Government. This then is another example of the
vital relation between a private group and the government which makes
the private group the agent of the government and thus subject to
constitutional limitations.
36. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
37. 323 U.S. at 202-03.
38. Id. at 198.
39. Justice Murphy, concurring, criticized the Court for this hedging: "[The case]
raises a grave constitutional issue that should be squarely faced. . . . If the Court's
construction rests on this basis [of constitutional requirement], I agree. But I am not
sure that such is the basis." Id. at 208-09.
40. The Steele case arose under the fifth amendment; the principles are the same.
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An even more cryptic case is Shelley v. Kraemer. The owner of
'real property subject to a fifty-year covenant restricting its use and
occupancy to members "of the Caucasian race" sold the property to
the Shelleys, Negroes. The owners of other property subject to the
restrictive covenant brought suit to restrain the Shelleys from taking
possession or title. The Supreme Court held that enforcement of this
agreement by the state courts constituted state action.
The state's concern with the agreement was only the protection
of property and contractual rights; the covenant's contents were ir-
relevant. An even more vexing aspect of the case is the difficulty of
logically limiting its application. Does it apply whenever a party takes
a dispute to court? Does it apply only to contracts? Only between
willing buyers and willing sellers? Or only to contracts involving re-
strictive covenants on land? And what reasoning supports any of these
limitations?
We shall return to the Shelley case. Our concern with it here is
to illustrate that the Supreme Court intends not to limit the concept of
state action but to expand it. That the Court does not intend to re-
treat from Shelley is made clear by Barrows v. Jackson,41 which held
unconstitutional not only specific performance of a restrictive covenant
but also the awarding of damages for its breach.'
Our next inquiry is, what other connections between a private
group and the state are likely to result in "state action"? To deter-
mine this we shall examine the decisions and underlying theories of
state and lower federal courts. Using the opinions we have discussed
as their guides, these courts have applied the term "state action" to a
myriad of fact situations. From these cases may be sifted two relation-
ships between the private individual or group and the state which
should result in "state action."
THE "STATE PROPERTY" THEORY
When public property is used for public purposes the user should
be subject to constitutional restrictions as to its use, regardless of the
property relationship between the state and the user. The state should
be under a constitutional obligation to see that its property is used in
only the same manner as the state could use it directly; a lease or
trust should not be allowed to obscure constitutional rights. A prop-
41. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
42. Two other cases which present problems similar to those in Shelley but add
little to the discussion here are Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
and Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), order vacated and cert. dis-
missed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
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erty relationship between the state and the private party should be
sufficient to result in "state action."
These propositions are suggested initially by two swimming
pool cases, Culver v. City of Warren " and Lawrence v. Hancock."
In each a municipality leased a city pool to a lessee who refused the
facilities to Negroes. In each case the court found that the city was
using the lease as a device to avoid its constitutional responsibilities:
there was a history of social tensions in connection with opening the
pool, the rent was nominal. In Culver the city even maintained the pool.
The court in Culver found that "the real purpose of the lease
to a private club, however it may have been disguised, was to ex-
clude colored people from the use of this recreational facility." "
Later, the court spoke of "piercing superficial forms" and a "colorable
leasing arrangement," 4 and concluded that the lessee was "a mere
agent or instrumentality through which the City of Warren operated
the swimming pool." 4
In Lawrence v. Hancock the court observed that:
"Justice would be blind indeed if she failed to detect the real
purpose in this effort of the City of Montgomery to clothe a public
function with the mantle of private responsibility. 'The voice is
Jacob's voice' even though 'the hands are the hands of Esau.' It
is clearly but another in the long series of stratagems which govern-
ing bodies of many white communities have employed in attempt-
ing to deprive the Negro of his constitutional birthright; the equal
protection of the laws." 4
It will be noted that these cases contain an element not mentioned
in the propositions at the head of this section, namely, that the city had
an unconstitutional purpose in effecting the leasing arrangement. The
lease was entered into in an attempt to exclude Negroes. Should courts
look behind the property relationship in order to determine the city's
intent or purpose before passing on the constitutional question of "state
action"? Different courts have answered the question differently.
Intent Under the "State Property" Theory
In Kern v. City Comnm'rs 4" the state action question was decided
on the pleadings, which did not contain an averment as to the city's
purpose in leasing its pool. Furthermore, the lessee operated the pool
43. 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
44. 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948).
45. 84 Ohio App. at 381, 83 N.E.2d at 87.
46. Id. at 381-82, 83 N.E.2d at 87.
47. Id. at 386, 83 N.E.2d at 88.
48. 76 F. Supp. at 1008.
49. 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940) (mandamus was denied for reasons im-
material here).
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for profit and paid $1,000 per season rent (in 1936). He was re-
quired to save the city harmless against all losses and to be insured
therefrom. Nevertheless, the court held the lessee subject to con-
stitutional restrictions. Discriminatory intent thus seems unnecessary.
A recent case which would support this reasoning is Department
of Conservation and Development v. Tate.50 The Negro plaintiffs were
refused admittance to a state-owned park. When they sued to enjoin
this as a violation of their constitutional rights, the state began to
arrange a lease of the property such as might avoid the contemplated
decree. The plaintiffs amended their prayer to add a request for an
injunction to restrain any lease that would allow the lessee to discrimi-
nate. Although the state sought to justify the lease on purely economic
grounds, its true purpose was evident to the court. However, the
injunction did not distinguish between a lease for the purpose of
excluding Negroes from the park and a lease executed for any other
purpose. Rather, the permanent injunction contained this broad
language: "If said park or any part thereof is leased, the lease must
not, directly or indirectly, operate so as to discriminate against the
members of any race." " Further, it enjoined any "lessees" from
denying to "any person of the Negro race, by reason of his race and
color, the right to use and enjoy the facilities." "2
On the other hand, in Easterly v. Dempster"' it was held that
where the city had leased its golf course to a private corporation for
financial reasons-the city had lost $26,700 in operating the golf
course in the previous four years-rather than to deprive the plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights, any discrimination by the lessee was that
of a private party and not of the state.
It would seem that the question of the state's purpose in allowing
a private group or individual to discriminate is too tenuous an inquiry
on which to turn constitutional rights. Attempts to disguise purposes
would become common; regardless of a court's indicia for determining
purpose, a city could tailor those factors to serve its objective. Who
is to say that a city has one purpose in effecting a lease when it has
been losing money in operation of the property or project but another
when the lease is executed from the time of the project's inception?
Moreover, even if the city's intent could be easily and with cer-
tainty ascertained, it is irrelevant. A municipality perspicacious
enough to know the effect of what it does should not have less freedom
50. 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
51. Id. at 616.
52. Ibid.
53. 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
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of action than the municipality that is either too ignorant or naive to
recognize that its support is being lent to discrimination.
Support for this position may be found in two Supreme Court
cases. In Marsh v. Alabama the Court did not inquire into whether
there was behind the trespass conviction a state or municipal policy
to discriminate against any particular individual or sect. On the con-
trary, it seems clear that the state's only concern in enacting and enforc-
ing the "loitering" statute was the protection of property interests.
5 4
This view also seems bolstered by the Supreme Court's reversal
of Sweeney v. Louisville.5 The City of Louisville rented a theatre for
the summer to the Louisville Park Theatrical Association. The lessee
refused to admit Negroes to performances. The lower court refused
relief on the ground that, under the separate-but-equal doctrine, there
was no denial of equal protection because Negro organizations were as
free to rent the facilities of the theatre as whites. The lower court,
therefore, did not reach the question of whether the lessee was bound
by constitutional limitations. In a per curiam decision the Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration
in the light of Brown v. Board of Education,6 which repudiated the
separate-but-equal doctrine in elementary and secondary schools. In so
indicating that there may have been a denial of equal protection that
would merit relief, the Court implicitly recognized that the lease to a
private organization would not preclude such relief, for otherwise the
Brown decision could not affect the result. Thus, there was here
"state action" despite the lease. If this is true, the case is particularly
meaningful because there is no indication from the record that the
primary purpose or intent of the city was to provide for a segregated
theatre audience. While we cannot be sure just what the Supreme
Court meant by its decision, it is an indication that property leased
from a municipality may not be used in a discriminatory manner regard-
less of how the city may justify it.
It should be noted that the "state property" theory could have
been applied to several other cases, but was not. In two such cases
the theory was unnecessary, since "state action" was found on more
traditional grounds.5 However, in a third, Norris v. Mayor," the
54. The same may be said of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and cases
in its train. See pp. 234-36 infra.
55. 102 F. Supp. 525 (W.D. Ky. 1951), aff'd sub norn., Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), rev'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
56. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Pub. Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945); Nash v. Air Terminal Services, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Va. 1949).
58. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
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court failed to consider the facts from this approach. The result, it
is submitted, is erroneous. The court held no "state action" despite the
fact that the Maryland Institute, a trade school charged with a dis-
criminatory admissions policy, leased a municipal building from the
city for $500 a year. The admitted fair rental value was $12,000 per
annum.
Before considering the application of the "state property" theory
to the Girard case, at least two qualifications of the theory should be
observed. The first is suggested by the Norris case. There may be a
situation where the use of state property is such an incidental part of the
operation that it would be unfair to characterize the entire project as
state action. In such a case damages for past violations should not be
allowed against the private organization. However, an injunction
should lie against further unconstitutional use of state property."9
A second qualification is incorporated in the statement of the
theory at the beginning of this section: The private organization must
use the property for public purposes. A tenant who rents his apart-
ment from a state-owned housing development should not be subject to
the same constitutional limitations imposed on the state. Two elements
readily suggest themselves to determine whether the use is a public or
private one: Is the activity one which is commonly undertaken by the
state? Is the activity open to the public or a large segment thereof?
These are not suggested as mechanical tests, but as guides. Similar
concepts have been developed case by case to distinguish public from
private corporations. 0 Borderline cases readily suggest themselves,
e.g., a lease of state owned property to a department store that refuses
to employ Negroes. The judicial vehicle of decisions is an appropriate
one for the development of this concept. An orphanage, school or
recreational facilities seem clearly to fall on the public side of the line.
"State Property" and the Girard Estate Case
Several reasons may be urged as to why the state property theory
should not apply to the Girard Estate case.
The first objection is that the City of Philadelphia owns title only
as trustee. As the Orphans' Court in its en banc opinion stated, "The
possession of the City, as trustee, is the possession of the testator,
Girard." "1 The short answer to this may be found in Justice Frank-
59. The latter remedy was sought and denied in the Norris case. The remedy
against the state has been labeled intensive enforcement; against the private party,
extensive enforcement. See Note, 61 HIv. L. Riyv. 344, 347 (1948).
60. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819) ; cf. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94 (1952); Vermillion v. Woman's College, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
61. Girard Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 671, 717-18 (Philadelphia County Orphans Ct.
1956).
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furter's opinion in Marsh v. Alabama: "Title to property as defined by
State law controls property relations; it cannot control issues of civil
liberties. *" 62 The longer answer is that a gift to the city in
trust for charitable purposes is no different in substance from a gift in
fee for the same purposes. There are limits to the uses to which a city
may put its property regardless of whether the city received title by
purchase or gift. A municipality may .administer a trust only "for
public purposes, germane to its object." ' While there are advantages
to a city's serving as trustee,E there are concomitant restrictions. A
testator who devises or bequeaths property to a city must be taken to
know that these restrictions thenceforth apply. What a city may not do
directly it should not be permitted to do indirectly by accepting gifts for
the unlawful use. This principle is not unknown to the law. It has
been held, for example, that "municipal corporations cannot hold land
in trust for religious purposes." 65
The second argument against the theory's application to the Girard
Estate case is that the restriction against Negroes was placed on the
property by Girard rather than by the city. This is simply another way
of saying that the city had no purpose or intent to discriminate, that
the discrimination originated solely with the private individual. How-
ever, once the gift is complete, the property is no different from other
city property. That the city's purpose or intent in allowing its property
to be used in a discriminatory manner is irrelevant has already been
dealt with 66 and will be discussed in greater detail in the succeeding
section.67
Finally, it is urged that one cannot speak of a city's obligation to
see that property is used within certain limits when the city received
the property with other obligations already attached to the property.
We may not speak of obligations, so this reasoning runs, unless there
is a freedom to fulfill them. However, there may be a constitutional
obligation to refuse to accept title or, in the alternative, to obtain a
court decree that the restriction be removed. Thus the city's obliga-
tion may be easily met in this manner; it has thus been required and
met before.68
62. 326 U.S. at 511.
63. Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 181 (1870); see 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 982 (5th ed. 1911) ; 10 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION § 2825 (3d
ed. 1950).
64. See note 105 infra.
65. City of Maysville v. Wood, 102 Ky. 263, 268, 43 S.W. 403, 404 (1897); see
Bullard v. Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891).
66. See pp. 222-24 supra.
67. See pp. 231-36 infra.
68. Bullard v. Shirley, 153 Mass. 559, 27 N.E. 766 (1891) ; see City of Maysville
v. Wood, 102 Ky. 263, 43 S.W. 403 (1897).
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THE MEANING OF STATE CONTACTS
In the earlier discussion of Supreme Court cases dealing with
"state action" we noted that when a private group undertook to per-
form a public function that was considered an exclusive function of the
state, such as voting or operating a municipality, the private group was
held to be the agent of the state for constitutional purposes. Now we
consider under what conditions, if any, a private group will be subject
to the fourteenth amendment when it exercises a public function that
is not considered the exclusive function of the state.
The theory advanced by which a private group may become sub-
ject to the fourteenth amendment might be denominated as the "state
contacts" or "degree of control" theory. It may be stated as follows:
Under some circumstances state contact, control and encouragement
may be so intimately fused with the activities of a private group or
individual in the performance of a public function that it seems fair to
call the activity "state action" within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. 9
Such a theory is necessarily incorporated into the Constitution.
So long as some public functions may be undertaken both by the state
and by private citizens, a distinction must be made between them for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Education, the subject matter of the Girard Estate case, illustrates
this point. We may pose two polar cases: A local public school system
administered by elected officials and maintained by public funds is
clearly subject to the equal protection clause. On the other hand, Miss
Carter's Country Day School, managed by Miss Carter with her own
funds, is just as clearly not subject to the fourteenth amendment. The
theory stated in the preceding paragraph adumbrates a rule for dis-
tinguishing between the two polar cases and for deciding the more
difficult cases that lie between.
Each borderline case must be decided on its own bottom by a
careful scrutiny of all the contacts between the state and the private
party, the degree of control exercised over the operation of the project
and the encouragement given it by the state.
This process may be illustrated in the field of education by Parker
v. University of Delaware.7" In finding that the University of Dela-
ware was a state institution for purposes of the fourteenth amendment,
the court considered the following factors: The University had its ori-
gin with the state legislature, several statutes had been passed relating
69. Cf. Berle, Limitations on Corporate Activity, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 948-51
(1952).
70. 31 Del. Ch. 381, 75 A2d 225 (1950).
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to the University, the board of trustees was appointed by governmental
officers, governmental officers by virtue of their public office are mem-
bers of the board of trustees, the state contributes funds to the Univer-
sity. The court chose no one of these facts as crucial but considered
their cumulative, conglomerate effect.
Within this context the "state property" theory discussed in the
preceding section will be seen as one contact that may be deemed
decisive. Perhaps as the "contacts" theory becomes more highly
articulated by future decisions, we may isolate other factors or types of
factors which may be equally decisive. Present case literature, how-
ever, has not proceeded that far. The types of public functions under-
taken by private citizens are as varied as the functions of the state; the
cases in which each function is considered are few.
Judicial Views of State Contacts
Different courts have dealt with state contacts sometimes more,
sometimes less, sympathetically. The extent to which courts will
"pierce superficial forms" has varied. A strict legalistic view is illus-
trated by Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., "' where a low-rental
housing development involving the investment of $90,000,000 of
private funds denied applications for rental to Negroes. The state
contacts with the development have been summarized by Judge Fuld
in his dissenting opinion:
"Not only did it [the state] fix their minimum rents and profits
but it laid down careful limitations with respect to their financing
and mortgaging, the selling or disposing of property or the alter-
ing of the structures. To the city governments, the statute gave
authority to approve any plan for a proposed development and
power to include, by contract, provisions for the 'operation and
supervision of the project.' In addition, the City was enabled to
use certain of its governmental powers to aid the work. It was
empowered to condemn property by eminent domain in order to
assemble the area to be rehabilitated, and then to convey the
property to the redevelopment companies at cost; to close off and
transfer public streets; and to grant tax exemptions on the im-
provements for a twenty-five year period." 72
The project would not have been substantially different had the city
borrowed the funds from a private party at a fixed interest rate and
constructed and managed the project itself.
71. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
72. Id. at 537, 87 N.E.2d at 552 (references to sections of the statute have been
omitted from the quotation).
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The New York Court of Appeals failed to find state action despite
a persuasive contention by the dissent 73 that a policy to discriminate
was imputable to the state since the city knew when it approved the
contract with Stuyvesant Town that Negroes would be excluded and
the city excepted Stuyvesant Town from an ordinance forbidding racial
discrimination in similar projects.74  The court distinguished all
previous decisions by labeling the governmental support of discrimina-
tion in those cases as "direct" 75 -one of the most distracting weasel-
words known to the law-and characterizing the state contacts with
Stuyvesant Town as "helpful cooperation." 71
By way of contrast, Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Pub. Library 7
is the leading case piercing technical forms to find "state action."
There, plaintiff was excluded because of her color from the Baltimore
public library's employee training school. The library's origin may be
traced to a private gift to the city in 1882 on condition that the city
contribute $50,000 annually to the library, that a self-perpetuating
board of trustees be incorporated to manage the library, and that annual
reports be made to the city. The city and state legislature passed the
appropriate ordinances and acts to comply with the conditions. In 1907
a gift to the city by Andrew Carnegie for library purposes on condition
that the city make substantial contributions was added to the funds
of the corporation. Title to the property and monies of both gifts
remained in the city, while management was vested in the board of
trustees through the corporation. In 1927 the city floated a bond
issue approved by the voters to increase the money available to the
corporation. At the time of the suit the city was contributing over
$800,000 a year to the corporation, which managed what had grown
into a system of libraries serving the entire city.
Salaries of the library staff are paid by the city's payroll office and
charged to the library appropriation. Library employees participate
in the municipal employees' retirement system. The library budget is
73. Id. at 536, 538, 87 N.E.2d at 551, 552-53.
74. Cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). It has been suggested that cer-
tiorari was denied because this ordinance makes it impossible for the situation to arise
again in New York. Cf. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
75. "All of the previous decisions, and those cited, might be distinguished in that
they disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to aid in discriminating or
deprivation of right .... " 299 N.Y. at 533, 87 N.E.2d at 550.
76. "To say that the aid accorded respondents is nevertheless subject to these
[constitutional] requirements, on the ground that helpful co-operation between the
State and the respondents transforms the activities of the latter into State action,
comes perilously close to asserting that any State assistance to an organization which
discriminates necessarily violates the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 535, 87 N.E2d
at 551.
77. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
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submitted to municipal authorities for approval, along with a report to
the city on the past year's proceedings, the condition of the library, and
receipts and disbursements.
The court found that the library was an instrumentality of the
state and therefore subject to constitutional restraints: the Negro
plaintiff's application must be considered without regard to race or
color.
It should be noted that the city's contribution to the library might
have been made the sole basis for the decision in the Kerr case. Mone-
tary contributions are simply a variant of the "state property" theory.
The court, however, proceeding on the state contacts theory in a more
general sense, considered the city's financial aid only as an element by
which the city exercises control over the library.7 The court observed
that:
"Even if we should lay aside the approval and authority given by
the state to the library at its very beginning we should find in the
present relationship between them so great a degree of control over
the activities and existence of the library that it would be unreal-
istic to speak of it as a corporation entirely devoid of government
character." "
It concluded rhetorically, "How then can the well-known policy
of the Library . . . be justified as solely the act of a private organi-
zation when the state, through the municipality, continues to supply it
with the means of existence." so
State Contacts in the Girard Estate Case
The Girard Estate case combines many of the factors which the
courts considered important in both the Parker and the Kerr cases.
The contacts between the College and the City of Philadelphia are
many and varied: An agent of the city, the Board of Directors of City
Trusts, actually manages Girard College (thus presenting a closer
management relationship with the state than in Parker or Kerr).
Several statutes have been passed in regard to the College (as in
Parker), including one which was thought necessary to allow the city
to serve as trustee.8" The administrators of the school are appointed
78. See id. at 217.
79. Id. at 219.
80. Ibid.
81. PA. S' 'r. ANN. tit. 53, § 6792 (Purdon 1931) (Act of Feb. 27, 1847). Other
statutes relating to the Girard Trust are: Id. § 6791 (Act of March 24, 1832); id.
§ 6798 (Act of June 30, 1869). The city has passed many ordinances relating to the
College and Girard Trust.
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by governmental officers (as in Parker-in Kerr only the original
board of directors was appointed by the city, after which the board
became self-perpetuating); governmental officers, the Mayor and
President of the Councilmanic Chamber, are ex officio members of the
board (as in Parker). The legislature regulates the method of selec-
tion of the managing body (as in Parker); annual reports are made to
a governmental body (as in Kerr); and a governmental officer audits
the books of the project (as in Kerr). Girard College originated
in a gift in trust to the city, while in Kerr the library originated in a
gift on condition to the city.
From the standpoint of sheer involvement, one can hardly imagine
greater contact between Girard College and the City of Philadelphia.
Even its daily operations are controlled by the city through its agents.
On the other hand, there are two factors which distinguish the
Girard Estate case from Kerr and Parker: First, the city contributes
not a penny to Girard College, while in Kerr and Parker large sums
were contributed by the city and state. Secondly, in Girard the dis-
crimination is not practiced through exercise of the managers' volition.
The discrimination is practiced as the specific requirement of Stephen
Girard, a private citizen. In Kerr and Parker the boards of directors
charged as state agents could have admitted Negroes to their respective
institutions had they so chosen. In Girard, however, there is even some
doubt as to whether the state could remove the restriction by statute.
s2
Appraisal of the factors thus arrayed on either side requires a
determination of their significance for finding state action. What is
the significance of such contacts? The answer is deceptively simple:
To find state action we must find that the state is the effective source of
the discrimination.
It is deceptively simple because of the temptation to dispose of
the case merely by saying that here the source of the discrimination is
Stephen Girard, and not the City of Philadelphia, just as it would have
been simple to say that the source of discrimination in the Kerr case
was the independent, self-perpetuating board of trustees, or in Smith
v. Allwright that the source of the discrimination was the Democratic
Party and not the State of Texas.
The State as the Effective Source of Discrimination
The state's purpose in permitting a private party to take the
condemned action may, but need not necessarily, be to accomplish dis-
82. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518
(1819) ; Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 92 (1890) ; Brown v. Hummel,
6 Pa. 86 (1847) ; cf. Conovaro v. Brothers, 326 Pa. 76, 94, 191 Atl. 140, 149 (1937).
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crimination. When the state's purpose in allowing the action is to
achieve discrimination, state action clearly results. Thus in Smith v.
Allwright, where the state's purpose in freeing the Democratic Party
from state regulation was to have an all-white primary, the private
group was held to the same standards as the state. In the swimming
pool cases," where the lease was effected to deprive Negroes of the
use of city pools, the lessee was held bound by the same restrictions as
the state.
But the policy of a state in permitting discrimination may be
expressed more subtly. In the conduct of elections, a policy to dis-
criminate will be imputed to the state even though the state is guilty
only of the "abdication" of its power to control elections.8 4 Similarly,
in Kern v. City Comrn'rs a policy to discriminate was imputed to the
state from the mere rental of a swimming pool even though the city's
purpose was only to use the property productively in a proprietary
capacity. The city had an obligation to see that its property was used
in a non-discriminatory manner. If it failed so to do, a policy of
discrimination was imputed to it.
In other words, as the concept of "state action" expands, greater
obligations are placed on the state to insure that activities with which
it is associated do not discriminate. If the private party wishes to
discriminate it may, but the state must withdraw its support.
Thus, in determining whether the state is the effective source of
discrimination the relationship with the state is all that is important.
It is irrelevant that the private party also is responsible for the dis-
crimination; only by showing that the state is not responsible may
constitutional restraints be avoided.
State Grants of Special Powers or Privileges
Just as we have argued that when a state allows a private party
to use its property the state is obligated to insure a non-discriminatory
use of the property, so when a state grants a special power or privilege
to a party the state is obligated to insure that the power is used in
a non-discriminatory manner. When a state grants to one of its
citizens an unusual power or privilege, it is presumably acting in the
public interest. This is the state's way of furthering the public weal;
by the grant of power or privilege the state is fulfilling its function.
In so doing, it becomes a party to, a partner in, the fostered project.
83. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City
of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E2d 82 (1948).
84. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953).
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The grant of an unusual power or privilege may thus result in "state
action."
What powers and privileges result in the state's becoming a party
to the project are difficult to determine. Only a case by case analysis
can suffice. In each case the question is: Does the power or privilege
confer on a private party an especially advantageous position so that
in substance the state can be said to be taking a part in the project?
There is no fool-proof method of distinguishing a power or
privilege on the one hand from mere regulation on the other. The
power or privilege may be viewed as an activity open to all comers pro-
viding they meet certain standards and comply with specified regula-
tions. For example, in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., where the
statute was cast in the form of regulation of companies wishing to
construct public housing developments, if any company met the re-
quirements it received the privileges and powers. However, it should
not be too difficult for courts to penetrate the form to determine the
essential relationship between the state and the private party. In Dor-
sey a special tax exemption and the power of eminent domain were
granted to the private party to foster and encourage the project. The
extreme example of the grant of a power is Steele v. Louisville & N.
R.R., where a union was given the right of exclusive representation.
In contrast, the control exercised by the Federal Communciations
Commission over a radio station has been held to be mere regulation.
8 5
But on the other hand, the franchise granted to a public utility would
seem clearly a power or privilege resulting in state action. The au-
thority placed in a board of bar examiners to decide who may practice
law in a state might also be considered such a power, but it has been
held otherwise."'
Another problem that may arise when "state action" results from
the granting of a power or privilege involves the relationship between
the power or privilege and the respect in which discrimination is
practiced. For example, where the power of eminent domain is
granted, it may be argued that state action is present only in the exer-
cise of the power itself. It would seem that this argument fails to
recognize that by the grant of the power the state becomes a party to the
ultimate project, since the power is granted pursuant to the state's
design to foster that project. Nevertheless, a difficult question is
presented where the discriminatory practice is only remotely related
85. Mclntire v. Win. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
86. Mason v. Hitchcock, 108 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1939). Query whether the bar
examiners could require that all successful applicants be members of the Caucasian
race?
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to the granted power or privilege. Such a problem was posed in
Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.8 7 There, plaintiffs alleged refusal of
their application to purchase homes in Levittown solely on the ground
of their color. The claim in federal court was that by the Govern-
ment's guarantee of purchasers' mortgages through the VA and FHA,
the project itself became governmental action and was therefore subject
to constitutional restraints against racial discrimination. The federal
agencies do not guarantee a mortgage unless the property meets detailed
construction requirements and unless the terms and amount of the
mortgage meet other specifications. Plaintiffs contended "that the
regulation and control exercised by the federal agencies in Levittown
is so extensive, the relationship between the federal agencies and
Levitt is so intimate, the federal aid in this instance so crucial to the
development of a community like Levittown and federal involvement
in Levitt's determinations so great that the actions of Levitt must be
deemed to be the acts of the federal agencies." "8 The court dismissed
the complaint for lack of a federal question.
One of the difficulties in finding "state action" in Levitt is that the
relationship between the discrimination and the guaranteeing of the
mortgage is so distant. The government agencies only guarantee the
purchaser's mortgage; the seller may or may not be the mortgagor.
The government guarantee is for the purpose of enabling those qualified
to finance the purchase of their individual homes. Notwithstanding, it
may be suggested that this is only the legal form of the transaction, that
in substance the mortgage guarantees are simply a bit of social engin-
eering aimed at encouraging parties like Levitt to construct new
housing developments and that the government mortgages were an
integral part of the entire project. Whether this is true so as to make
the-government a party to the project and the effective source of the
discrimination is a close question.
Use of State Facilities
Finally, a policy condoning discrimination may be imputed to the
state, thus making it the effective source of discrimination, when the
state allows its facilities to be used to practice discrimination. This
appears to be the holding of the hallmark of "state action" cases, Shelley
v. Kraemer.8 9
A major difficulty commentators have found with Shelley is in
determining when discriminations may be enforced by a court. It has
87. 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
88. Id. at 116.
89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see p. 221 supra.
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been suggested that the Shelley rationale may be extended to the point
where the only private discrimination that may be practiced is that
voluntarily accepted by the parties, and that once the sanction of the
court is sought, state action results." By this view, a seller could not
refuse to sell to a Negro solely on the basis of his color if the Negro
sought court aid in enjoining the practice. 1
Most observers would not agree with this formulation. Yet it is
difficult to find another logical limit to the underlying proposition that
whenever private discrimination is "supported by the full panoply of
state power," 92 state action results. Or to use the language of another
case, "When authority derives from Government's thumb on the scale
the exercise of that power by private citizens becomes closely akin, in
some respects, to its exercise by Government itself." I
It seems clear, however, that the principle will not be applied to
the extent indicated above. Otherwise we would find state action in
Girard Estate by the very refusal of the Orphans' Court to grant some
kind of relief. A similar argument could be advanced in any case
where a court rejects a contention that "state action" existed. Several
limits to the Shelley case have been suggested.
The Shelley case may be limited to cases involving restrictive
covenants. In its historical setting, the case is one of a series which
have struck at attempts to limit occupancy and use of real property to
white people. 4 Perhaps because of this history involving state at-
90. Iuber, Revolution in Private Law?, 6 S.C.L.Q. 8 (1953).
91. Id. at 26-27.
92. 334 U.S. at 19.
93. American Communications Association, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401
(1950).
94. The cases are legion. See, e.g., Gandolpho v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1892) (a case largely ignored, holding, as Shelley, that a state may not enforce
restrictive covenants) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding unconstitu-
tional a city ordinance denying to Negroes the right to occupy houses in blocks in
which the majority of houses were occupied by whites, and vice versa); Corrigan
v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (in effect reversed by Shelley) ; Richmond v. Deans,
281 U.S. 704 (1930).
Cases following Shelley are Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (suit for
damages based on violation of restrictive covenant could not be maintained) ; Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), order vacated and cert. dismissed, 349 U.S.
70 (1955) (restrictive covenant may be used as a defense to a tort suit for damages) ;
Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 31, 88 S.E.2d 114
(1955) (upholding enforcement of a fee simple determinable subject to the condition
subsequent that the land not be used by Negroes) ; Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (restrictive covenant providing for forfeiture no defense to
an action of ejectment by the purchaser on sale or lease to a Mexican). For general
discussions of the problem see Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rzv.
508; Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Cov-
enant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. R1v. 203 (1949).
For maneuvers to evade the effect of Shelley, see Walker, Judicial Enforcement
of Racial Restrictive Covenants-The Spurious Expansion of "State Action," 59 VA.
B.A. R4P. 231 (1948) ; Note, 37 CALIvi. L. Rav. 493 (1949).
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tempts to create "Negro zoning laws," a policy of discrimination will
be imputed to the state in enforcing such private agreements. But
McGhee v. Sipes, 5 the companion case to Shelley, came from Michi-
gan, a state where there was no such history. While a policy of
discrimination may be imputed to the state because state enforcement
of private agreements allows the state to accomplish indirectly what it
could not accomplish by statute or ordinance,"8 this is true of almost
all private discrimination.
Secondly, the Shelley holding may be limited to contract cases
(or perhaps contract cases involving restrictive covenants) where there
is a willing buyer and a willing seller. 7 According to this theory the
Shelley decision rests on the fact that there were two contracts, a con-
tract of sale and a contract restricting sale, only one of which could be
fulfilled. In deciding which of such contracts is binding, a court may
not use its power to enforce the discriminatory one; between the two
property rights claimed, the civil right turns the balance. While this
theory might be a basis for limiting Shelley's application, it hardly
clarifies its meaning since the discriminatory contract was earlier in
time and in terms controls the second. Without considering the civil
right, there is no doubt as to which way the scales dip.
Perhaps the answer is that the state may not order discrimination
by its decree, but when it is called upon to take affirmative action to
prevent discrimination it may refuse to do so. The problem then be-
comes: When does a court decree" order discrimination? Most often
a decree ordering discrimination would involve a contract or property
right, and to this extent the limitation suggested above might be valid;
however, it still does not identify the crucial issue. The theory
that a court may not enforce, but need not prevent, discrimination
may explain the decision in Jackson v. Barrows and help us to under-
stand the court's difficulty with Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park,
luc.18 Would allowing a restrictive covenant to be used as a defense
in a tort suit be in effect enforcing discrimination? 0
95. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
96. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
97. "These are cases in which the States have made available to such individuals
the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race
or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing
and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell." 334 U.S.
at 19.
98. 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 348
U.S. 880 (1954), order vacated and cert. dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
99. If this view of Shelley is accepted, the decision in Charlotte Park and
Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 31, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), would seem
erroneous.
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State Contacts and the Effective Source of Discrimination in the
Girard Case
The question of when the state may allow its judicial facilities to
be used to enforce discrimination is really tangential to the problem
posed by the Girard Estate case. For once it is established that there
are some cases in which the state may not allow its courts to be used
to impose discrimination, it would seem that it may not permit its
facilities as trustee to be used to carry out a discriminatory scheme.
Thus, despite the fact that Girard supplied all the funds for the
College and despite the fact that he decreed the discriminatory practice,
the state is the effective source of the discrimination if it allows its
facilities to be used to carry out the plan. This, then, is the significance
of the relationships and contacts between Girard College and the state.
When the state allows its managerial facilities to be used to operate
a discriminatory scheme, state action results.
Just as in Shelley the enforcement of the decree would result in the
state's performing the physical act of discrimination, so in Girard
the management by the city results in the city's performing the
physical act of discrimination. In Shelley the state would have had
to remove the Shelleys from the land to enforce the decree; in Girard
the city would close the doors of Girard College to the Negro peti-
tioners.
In several respects the Girard Estate case is even stronger than
Shelley: In Shelley the court was called on only to enforce the
private discrimination; in Girard the state is called upon to carry out
and manage the discriminatory scheme. In Shelley the court stood
ready to enforce any private agreement that was otherwise legal; in
Girard the city's service as trustee is not available to private citizens
for their private purposes. The trust must be germane to the purposes
of the city. In fulfilling these purposes, the city may not constitutionally
discriminate against Negroes. In Shelley the parties to the agree-
ment were private individuals; in Girard, by accepting the trusteeship,
the state became a party to the agreement.
We have noted that private action is more likely to be stamped
with the imprimatur of state action if the private activity serves a
public function. In the Girard Estate case, the College serves a public
function. The contract in Shelley concerned only the parties to the
agreement.
It would seem, therefore, that if Shelley has any application to a
unique fact situation, Girard would be a case to apply it.
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Transcending legal forms, Girard College is simply the gift of a
unique school for orphan boys. Since the school henceforth belongs
to the city, the city may not accept the gift unless the school is subject
to the same constitutional restrictions as are other city schools.
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took an entirely different ap-
proach to the constitutional problem raised by the Girard Estate case
than has been here presented. By focusing on a different question,
the court reached a different conclusion.
The court presented the issue as follows: "The question then,
is whether the limitation in Girard's will to white children as the
beneficiaries of his college or orphanage, although undoubtedly lawful
at the time of the execution of the will and of his death, has become
invalid as a result of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
,, ' In thus directing itself to the validity of the restrictive
provision the court avoided the narrower and more perplexing issue.
The first and only constitutional question is whether city trusteeship
violates the fourteenth amendment. Only then does the question arise
of what is to be done-by way of removing the restriction against
Negroes or appointing a new trustee-and it is only to this question
that the validity of the restriction itself is pertinent. The constitutional
issue is simply whether the city may serve as trustee of a charitable
trust whose beneficiaries are limited to white children.
The constitutional issue is not whether Negroes must be admitted
to Girard College; it does not concern a man's right to dispose of his
property as he sees fit (although several pages of the opinion are de-
voted to this question); it does not involve an attempt to delete the
word "white" from the will; it is solely whether the city may con-
stitutionally serve as trustee. It is the remedy-not a constitutional
question-that is concerned with what is to be done if the city cannot
serve under the present terms of the will.
The court, however, having stated the problem as the constitu-
tional validity of the restriction, proceeds to treat the case as though
it were a desegregation case in which the narrower issue were whether
Girard College is a public school to which Negroes must be admitted
or a private school. Accordingly, the court concludes that "all pro-
visions of the will show that it was not intended to be a public
school.. , "o0
100. In re Estate of Stephen Girard, 127 A.2d 287, 291-92 (Pa. 1956).
101. Id. at 293.
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The problem of "state action" is much subtler than this. If the
approach of this court were applied in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,"°
we would simply have to determine whether the union were a public
or private organization. Clearly if the problem were posed in this
way no "constitutional questions arise." ' The application of the
emergent concept of "state action" to any particular fact situation
requires a careful examination of the relationship between the State
and the resultant discrimination. This examination is not enhanced
by confusing the constitutional problem of whether the city may serve
as trustee under the present terms of the trust with the issue of the
remedy-whether a new trustee will be appointed or Negroes admitted.
Although the Court fails to recognize this in dealing with the
constitutional question, it nevertheless gives to the remedy separate
treatment in which it does distinguish between the constitutional prob-
lem and the remedy. It indicates that even if city trusteeship were
unconstitutional, the petitioners would still win only a pyrrhic victory
since the remedy would be the appointment of a private trustee rather
than the admission of Negroes to Girard College." 4 The remedy, so
long as it is constitutional, would, of course, be a matter of state law.
Under the doctrine of cy pres,0 5 the court could either appoint a
private trustee or admit Negroes in order to cure the present trustee's
102. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
103. Id. at 198.
104. In re Estate of Stephen Girard, 127 A.2d 287, 295 (Pa. 1956).
105. It should be noted that a new trustee would be appointed under the doctrine
of cy pres rather than by application of the familiar equitable maxim that a trust will
not fail for want of a trustee, for here the trustee is not merely a formal manager
but was chosen for its peculiar qualities and is an integral part of the trust scheme.
There can be no doubt that Girard placed special confidence in the city, for he knew
that he must "leave, necessarily, many details to the Mayor, Aldermen and citizens
of Philadelphia and their successors. . . ." Girard Will cl. XXI. As trustee, the city
adds prestige, repute and dignity to the project. Through reports to the legislature
and an audit by the city treasurer, the possibility of defalcation is minimized. These
were all purposes Girard had in mind when he designated the city as trustee. Further-
more, city trusteeship was to serve to quicken the interest of citizens in their choice
of government officials. "From the nature of my bequests and the benefit to-result
from them, I trust that my fellow citizens of Philadelphia, will observe and evince
especial care and anxiety in selecting members for their city councils, and other agents."
Ibid. Under these conditions, if the trustee cannot serve, there is a partial failure of the
trust which is saved by cy pres.
When a trustee of a charitable trust, chosen for its particular qualities, is unable
to serve, the normal application of the doctrine of cy pres would be the appointment
of a new trustee. However, this is so because usually there is no way of removing the
named trustee's infirmity. He has either died, refused to serve or is incompetent for
reasons unrelated to the trust itself. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cites Vidal v.
Mayor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844) for its statement that were the city unable to
serve as trustee the remedy would be the appointment of a private trustee. In re Es-
tate of Stephen Girard, supra note 104, at 295. The case is inapposite, however,
because the hypothetical infirmity with which the court was dealing in Vidal was in-
curable. In the present Girard Estate case the infirmity may be cured by removing the
racial restriction in the trust. In its application of cy pres and choice of alternative
remedies, the court should be guided by the supposed desires of the testator.
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infirmity. Whether or not the court would convert into holding its
dictum concerning the remedy after the exhaustive arguments that
would ensue on a remand from the United States Supreme Court
(assuming that Court held for the petitioners on the constitutional
issue), the gratuitous indication of the remedy presents more im-
mediate problems. If under no view of the case would the Negro
petitioners be admitted, the case as to them would be moot-as the
Pennsylvania court could hardly have been unaware. Thus the Negroes
could not have the decision reviewed in the United States Supreme
Court either by certiorari or appeal. 10
However, there are two other petitioners in the case. Both the
City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania inter-
vened on the side of the original Negro petitioners. Although the
city (as opposed to the Board of City Trusts) would not have stand-
ing in the Supreme Court since it has no legal interest in the trust,
the Commonwealth has an interest both as remainderman 10" and as
parens patriae charged with the enforcement of charitable trusts. But
if the appropriate remedy is to change trustees, the state would have
no standing in its capacity as remainderman. This squarely raises the
problem of whether the state has standing solely as parens patriae, an
issue which helps to make this case a lawyer's dream (or nightmare).
Among the several problems here is that the state appears on both sides
of the case, through the Attorney General and the Board of City Trusts.
The solution to this problem, happily, is belond the scope of this article.
106. See note 16 mpra.
107. The will provided that if the city knowingly and willfully violated any of
the testamentary conditions, the remainder was to go to the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania for the purposes of internal navigation, "excepting, however, the rents, issues
and profits of my real estate in the City and County of Philadelphia which shall for-
ever be reserved and applied to maintain the aforesaid college in the manner specified
in the last paragraph of the XXIst clause of this will." Girard Will cl. XXIV.
